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Abstract
A network of agents cooperate on a given area. Time evolution of
their power is described within a set of nonlinear equations. The limi-
tation of resources is introduced via the Verhulst term, equivalent to a
global coupling. Each agent is fed by some other agents from his neigh-
borhood. Two subsequent stages of the time evolution can be observed.
Initially, the richness of everybody increases distinctly, but its distribu-
tion becomes wide. After some transient time, however, resources are
exhausted. Richness of some agents falls to zero and they are eliminated.
Cooperation becomes less effective, what leads to subsequent falls. Fi-
nally, small percent of agents survive in a steady state. We investigate,
how the cooperation influences the rate of surviving.
1 Introduction
Physicists are happy. Their resources — amount of problems to solve — is
infinite. It is not so, however, in almost all other professions; the numbers of
car buyers, voters, butterflies to catch and girls to kiss for the first time are
limited. If one takes everything, others have to look for another hobby or job.
On the other hand, cooperation is a fingerprint of modern society. All what we
get except from our domestic gardens, we get from other people. The aim of this
work is to present numerical results of a set of equations, where the above facts
are built in as assumptions. The only way to increase one’s power or richness
or speed of getting resources, which are treated here as synonymous, is to profit
work of somebody else. Then, each agent i has M neighbours {j(i)} who feed
its with given speeds Jij . The limitation of resources is taken into account as
the global coupling via a nonlinear Verhulst-like term. These are first two r.h.s.
terms of our basic equations (1), and these terms do not depend on i. Third
term is to include some action of an i-th agent. Namely, it selects from his
neighbours the one most sensitive for this action, and enhances feeding from
this particular neighbour.
The problem belongs to the large class of models designed to describe a
competition for resources [1]. Most frequently, however, some kind of dynamic
equilibrium is considered, and only a few authors are interested in an ultimate
catastrophe. Example giving, although statistical physics provides tools for
analysing stock market [2], the term “bankruptcy” is absent in physical journals
1
(see [3] and [4] for exceptions). It seems worthwhile to take a glance on a collision
of expanding society with the boundary of limited resources.
2 Model
Time evolution of the individual agent power Pi is described by differential
equation:
dPi(t)
dt
= λ1 ·
M∑
j=1
JijPj(t)rj(t)− λ2 ·

 1
N
N∑
j=1
Pj(t)rj(t)


2
+λ3 · max
1≤j≤M
[dijPj(t)rj(t)]
(1)
Coupling constant Jij (speed of feeding) and dij (sensitivity) are random posi-
tive reals normalized to unity and fixed during simulation, while λ1, λ2 and λ3
describe intensities of the three terms. The constants ri are equal to one for
active agents and to zero in other case. At the beginning, all agents are active,
but once Pi is negative for given i, ri is switched to zero and the i-th agent is
eliminated from the game. We deal with a set of differential equations which are
piecewisely continuous. At the moments of time t∗ when Pi(t
∗) = 0 for any up-
to-now-active agent i, the equations are switched from one analytical solution to
another one. In this sense, the formalism is equivalent to a coupled map lattice,
but the number of equations changes in time. Similar approach was applied
already in [5]. Note however that in our case, the maps are to be integrated nu-
merically. We consider two different neighbourhoods: (i) each individual has M
randomly chosen neighbours, or (ii) each individual has M nearest geometrical
neighbours. In the latter case, the agents form a one-dimensional chain with
periodic boundary conditions. Note that the formed network of agents is a con-
tinuous analogue to the Kauffman model [6], designed for a simulation of genetic
systems. We solve (1) numerically and check how the kind of neighbourhood,
the number of directly interacting agents M and the strengths of interactions
influence (i) time evolution of the average power (ii) and number of active agents
after very long times. The simulation is started with N0 = 10
4 active agents
(ri = 1 for i = 1, · · · , N0), each with randomly chosen initial power Pi(t = 0).
The simulation takes Niter = 10
4 time steps, each 10−3 long, what guarantees
the numerical stability.
3 Results and discussion
Two subsequent stages of the time evolution can be observed independently of
kind of neighbourhood (Fig. 1). Initially, the average power increases distinctly,
but its distribution becomes wide. After some transient time, however, resources
are exhausted. Richness of some agents falls to zero and they are eliminated.
Cooperation becomes less effective, what leads to subsequent falls. Finally,
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Figure 1: Time evolution of (a) the average agent power 〈P 〉 expressed in arbi-
trary units and (b) subsequent percentage n of active agents for random (doted
line) and geometrical (solid line) neighbours.
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λ1 λ3 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0.5 78 63 61 59 58 55 48 52 49 48
1 93 77 71 65 60 60 58 54 54 52
1.5 96 84 76 73 67 65 62 59 57 44
2 96 91 85 78 71 70 65 63 60 37
2.5 97 94 89 82 75 72 70 65 64 59
3 97 95 92 86 81 76 74 69 67 66
3.5 97 96 92 90 86 79 76 73 70 68
4 97 97 95 91 87 89 78 75 71 72
4.5 97 96 95 92 89 86 81 78 78 75
5 97 96 96 93 92 88 83 81 80 73
Table 1: The percentage of the society’s successes for geometrical neighbourhood
and various sets of (λ1, λ3). M = 4, λ2 = 1, N0 = 10
4, Niter = 10
4, Nrun = 1000.
small percent of agents survive in a steady state. Distinct differences are found
between the cases of geometrical and random neighbourhood (Fig. 1). For
the case of random neighbours, usually only one agent survives, i = ult. This
simplifies Eq. (1) to
dPult(t)
dt
= −λ2 · P
2
ult(t) (2)
what gives subsequent power decrease of the last agent as 1/t. If two or more
cooperating agents survive, we are faced with a set of nonlinear equations. An-
alytically, a simplified case can be considered, when Jij = J , dij = d. Then, the
average power tends to a positive stable fixed point. Numerical results suggest,
that this is the rule also in the general case (Fig. 1). The marked difference
between the results for random and geometrical neighborhoods is an illustration
of the old truth do ut des. In other words, it is better to help friends which
can reward than to people randomly selected in the street. A group of agents
feeding each other can survive, if they spend resources moderately enough. A
kind of an equilibrium with a given environment seems to be possible for the
geometrical neighborhood, as long as the Verhulst term is compensated by the
remaining terms in Eq. (1).
The results given above refer to the case of the geometrical neighborhood.
Let us define as a success of a society the case when more than one cooperating
agents survive. Then, Tab. 1 gives the percentage of successes for various sets
of (λ1, λ3). It is astonishing (at least for us) that the roles of these two terms
(first and third) in the r.h.s. of Eq. (1) differ so much. Actually, both these
terms are designed to increase the power of a given agent. The difference is
only that the third term is a kind of local optimization, while the first one
is automatic. It seems that this kind of dynamic reaction of a given agent is
particularly relevant at the border of “death” (or “bankruptcy” or so), when
Pi is close to zero. Average power in asymptotic time, presented in Tab. 2,
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λ1 λ3 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0.5 0.73 0.87 1.23 1.58 1.73 1.71 2.24 2.43 2.92 3.06
1 1.30 1.50 1.56 1.97 2.15 1.99 2.84 2.92 3.56 3.71
1.5 1.84 2.13 2.26 2.17 2.72 2.17 3.01 3.55 4.25 3.22
2 2.43 2.54 2.70 2.97 2.74 3.31 3.22 4.07 4.29 4.92
2.5 2.96 3.30 3.29 3.66 3.73 4.20 4.05 3.61 3.63 4.05
3 3.47 3.63 4.11 3.76 4.42 4.09 4.06 4.06 4.34 4.54
3.5 4.09 4.21 4.41 4.73 4.72 4.85 4.80 4.62 5.00 5.65
4 4.63 4.68 5.02 5.10 5.77 4.91 5.52 5.26 5.88 5.89
4.5 4.87 5.15 5.45 5.89 5.88 5.81 5.97 7.06 5.88 6.28
5 5.43 5.68 5.87 6.19 6.48 6.20 6.96 6.58 6.53 6.76
Table 2: Average power 〈P 〉 (in arbitrary units) after Niter = 10
4 time steps
averaged over Nrun = 100 independent runs for geometrical neighbourhood and
various (λ1, λ3). M = 4, λ2 = 1, N0 = 10
4.
does not show this effect. There, both terms act in the same way and can be
mutually replaced to get approximately the same result.
4 Conclusions
We are somewhat surprised with the fury of crisis, which can be observed in
Fig. 1. Simultaneously, distinct but continuous progress of the average power is
substituted by wild oscillations, and the number of agents is strongly reduced.
The effect arises abruptly, without any preceding warnings in the curve shape.
Soon, unavoidable elimination of almost all agents is observed for all applied
sets of input parameters. We imagine the model as a parabolic description of
the process of breaking of bonds and a destruction of a complex system.
We feel that in this text, full of analogies, we are at the border of abuse of
language. We apologize for that. However, we have found that it is particularly
difficult to describe a transient process in precise terms of statistical physics,
most of them designed for stationary processes. Our process could be treated as
stationary, if we allow the population of agents to be slowly reproduced, maybe
with retaining some fruitful information, and the whole story is repeated many
times. This kind of investigation could link to a Penna-like model [7] and to
some kind of self-organization [6] of the structure and strength of bonds between
agents.
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